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INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is considered to be the next genera-
tion power supply network. It is regarded as
environmentally friendly because of two reasons.
First, through the communication network of the
system, the actual electricity demands of cus-
tomers can be obtained in advance to reduce
excess electricity generation. Second, it facili-
tates renewable energy power generation. Due
to the intermittent nature of renewable genera-
tion such as solar and wind power, increased
renewable penetration causes instability in the
power grid. Smart grid, with its sensor and com-
munication network, allows the system to better
anticipate problems and make appropriate con-
trol decisions, thereby improving system stability.
The smart grid project was initiated by the
European Union in 2003 [1]. At around the
same time, the U.S. Electric Power Research
Institute started the IntelliGrid project [2] while
the U.S. Department of Energy started the Grid
2030 project [3]. Under the Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 2007, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is
responsible for coordinating the development of
a framework for information management to
achieve interoperability of smart grid devices. In
early 2010, NIST released a report [4] that
describes the potential components of a smart
grid. Building a smart grid power system is an
important engineering project in most developed
or developing countries.
To facilitate our discussion, we simplify a
smart grid into three basic layers (Fig. 1):
• Power generators
• Substations (part of the transmission net-
work)
• Electric appliances being connected to a
smart meter
The smart meter will send demand informa-
tion (e.g., power usage plan) in advance to the
control center through wired or wireless net-
works (e.g., the Internet). If accepted, the con-
trol center will adjust the power generation
accordingly.
The security of a power supply system is also
a major issue in any country. It is a potential tar-
get for terrorists. The future design of a smart
grid system tends to make use of public Internet
connections (e.g., from smart meters to substa-
tions). As such, a smart grid may be more easily
affected by computer worms or viruses like the
Stuxnet virus [5] which infected Iran’s nuclear
installations in 2010. Thus, before a smart grid
system is deployed, it is critical to make sure
that it is fully secure. In fact, the security prob-
lems have been actively discussed within the
community (e.g., [4]). For the generator-to-sub-
station communications (i.e., the closed system
in the old days), some security measures are
already in place in the extended version of
SCADA [8]. On the other hand, not much
research has been done on the substation-to-
consumer communications yet.
There are two major security problems,
sender authentication and user privacy preserva-
tion, for these communications as described in
[6, 7]. Power request (or the power usage plan)
will be sent by smart meters to the correspond-
ing substation. Authentication of the sender is
needed before the request is sent to the control
center; otherwise, a trivial denial of service
attack can easily be launched. While authentica-
tion is necessary, the privacy of the sender must
be preserved. Otherwise, by observing the power
usage plan of a family, it is easy to know when
the family is not at home [6]. Obtaining this
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information enables a criminal to break into
one’s apartment at the right moment. Similar
concern also applies to commercial customers
who do not want others to know when their
offices are empty. 
In this article, we first introduce a new power
request paradigm. We then propose a scheme to
solve the security problems. Our solution can
preserve the privacy of the customers not only
from third parties, but also from the substation
and the power operator. At the same time, our
scheme provides authentication to prevent hack-
ers abusing the system. The core techniques
used in the scheme are two cryptographic primi-
tives: anonymous credential and blind signatures.
The scheme is also able to compute the charges
of each customer based on the amount of elec-
tricity requested during peak and non-peak
hours despite the fact that the authentication is
done anonymously. 
THE NEW
POWER REQUEST PARADIGM
Presently, a customer does not need to request
power because a traditional power system tries
to estimate the electricity demand (the load) and
generates enough electricity to satisfy the load.
Spinning reserves1 are used to cover any poten-
tial shortfall due to an underestimate of the
load. Any excess generation due to an overesti-
mate of the load and the spinning reserves lead
to waste. The impact is even worse for those
generators operating on fossil fuel due to the
pollutants released into the environment.
Smart grid may alleviate this problem. Power
is generated based on customers’ demands. How
can the power operators know customers’
demands? The answer is that customers need to
request power supply. Of course, it does not
make sense to require a customer to request
power each time he/she needs to turn on a small
electric appliance such as a mobile phone charg-
er. Normally, the power operator tries to main-
tain a basic power level that can satisfy most
customers’ average needs. Then when a cus-
tomer thinks that he/she needs more power to
turn on heavily loaded electric appliances such
as heaters or air-conditioners sometime in the
future, he/she is required to make additional
power requests. These requests can be sent at
different time periods such as one day ahead or
one week ahead, but not in real time.
Reference [9] is the first scheme that allows
customers to make power requests in a privacy-
preserving manner. They introduced the prob-
lem and proposed a solution, but the power
request model is not realistic. They assume that
a customer makes an additional power request
every time the basic power level cannot fulfill
his/her needs. That is, a customer may need to
make numerous power requests throughout a
day. This is not practical and may cause a signifi-
cant burden on the smart grid communication
network. Also, the customer may find it inconve-
nient to wait for a certain network delay before
the power operator can adjust the power level to
satisfy his/her needs.
A more realistic power request model is as
follows. A customer is required to submit a
power usage plan in advance. Such a plan can be
on a daily basis. The customer can tell the power
operator the time he/she needs additional power
together with the amount throughout the day
(e.g., 160 units of power for operating an air
conditioner from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., 120
units of power for operating a washing machine
from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.). In the future, this
can be made automatic by the smart meter,
which communicates with all household appli-
ances and stores the usage profile of the cus-
tomer, then predicts the power usage for the day
based on some artificial intelligence techniques.
The power operator then adjusts the schedule of
power generation accordingly. In fact, this power
request model is not new and was mentioned in
[10]. According to this work, the power operator
tries to minimize the risk of power generation
mismatch (especially those by renewable energy
sources) by collecting power plans one day or
one week ahead. Such power plans may be power
usage plans from customers.
In the traditional power supply paradigm,
customers are not subjected to privacy leakage.
Recall that a power operator installs a kWh
meter at each customer’s home. This kWh meter
records the total amount of electricity used by
the customer who is then charged accordingly
after each billing period (say at the end of each
month). What the power operator knows is the
total amount of electricity used by the customer.
However, in the new power request paradigm,
besides the total amount of electricity used, the
power request information also contains a cus-
tomer’s electricity usage pattern. For example,
by observing the power usage plan of a family, it
is easy to know when the family is not at home.
If a criminal obtains this information, the family
is susceptible to being burglarized. Therefore,
privacy concern is critical for such a new power
request paradigm.
Besides protecting the privacy of customers,
how to ensure the effectiveness of the power
request mechanism is another important issue.
Normally, a certain charge should be imposed
on a customer whenever he/she makes an addi-
tional power request. Otherwise, a customer may
Figure 1. A simplified smart grid architecture.
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1 Spinning reserve is the
additional generating
capacity that is available
by increasing the output of
the generators already
connected to the power
grid.
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simply make excessive power requests no matter
whether he/she will use the power requested or
not. As a result, excessive power is generated.
Therefore, we assume that a customer will be
charged according to the amount of additional
power requested in the power usage plan.
Nowadays, power operators usually encourage
customers to shift some heavy power usage to
non-peak hours. This can help to reduce the peak
of power generation which in turn can limit the
impact of air pollutants to the environment.
Therefore, it is a natural trend to require a cus-
tomer to take this into account when submitting
power usage plans. In fact, this can be done easily
by charging a customer more for power requests
made during peak hours than that during non-
peak hours. Our proposed scheme will allow the
charging to follow different charging profiles.
SECURITY PROBLEMS AND
REQUIREMENTS
In a smart grid, a smart meter is installed in
each customer’s home. Therefore, it is natural to
assume that it takes up the role of forwarding
customers’ power usage plans to the power oper-
ator. The control center can be a single server
located inside the power plant or distributed
servers located at different geographical loca-
tions for load balancing and to avoid a single
point of failure.
In this article, we focus on the challenge of
the trustworthiness of the parties involved. From
the power operator’s point of view, its control
center and substations are more trusted than the
customers since the control center and substa-
tions are usually physically protected. Smart
meters, on the contrary, are not physically pro-
tected and can be compromised by dishonest
customers or even by hackers who can then
abuse the system. From the customers’ point of
view, the power operator as well as its control
center and substations are only semi-trusted.
They perform security operations honestly, but
since they know the electricity usage pattern of
the customers, they may induce private informa-
tion of the customers (e.g., when they are at
home). As such, customers do not want to reveal
their private information to the power operator.
Besides, the communication channels from the
smart meters to the control center and from the
substations to the control center could be the
public Internet and is always considered unsafe.
We target designing a system to resolve the
following four security problems:
Message authentication: Every power usage
plan sent by any smart meter should be checked
to confirm that it is from a valid user. Authenti-
cation is the basis of the system. Without it, any-
one can abuse the system easily.
Identity privacy preservation: The real identi-
ty of the customer during the power usage plan
submission phase should be unknown to every-
one (including the power operator) to protect
the privacy of customers.
Request message confidentiality: The infor-
mation in any power usage plan should not be
known by any third party in order to protect the
privacy of the customers.
Traceability: The total amount of power
requested by each customer in a certain period
of time should be known by the power operator
(i.e., its control center) as a lump sum so that
the power operator can check whether the
amount of power requested is close to the actual
amount of power used. If the amount of power
requested is far more than the actual amount of
power used, excess power will be generated. On
the contrary, if the amount of power requested
is far less than the actual amount of power used,
system instability will be caused. Thus, a cus-
tomer should be subjected to additional charge
under both cases.
PROPOSED SCHEME TO
SOLVE SECURITY PROBLEMS
In this section, we propose a secure and privacy-
preserving scheme to solve the security problems
mentioned. Roughly speaking, our scheme can
be divided into four simple modules: system start-
up, credential request, power usage plan submis-
sion, and reconciliation. Let us describe each of
them in more details.
SYSTEM STARTUP
Recall that in a public key infrastructure (e.g.,
RSA), each party is assigned a public and private
key pair. Its public key is assumed to be known
by everyone, while its private key is only known
by itself. When A wants to send a message to
another party B, A encrypts the message using
B’s public key. B can then use its private key to
recover the message. Also, A uses its private key
to generate a digital signature on the message,
and B can use A’s public key to verify it.
In our scheme, during system startup, the con-
trol center assigns itself an RSA public and pri-
vate key pair for it to sign credentials and for
customers to encrypt messages to it. The public
key is assumed to be known by everyone while
the private key is only known by itself. Whenever
a new smart meter is registered, it will be assigned
a unique identity for identification purposes.
CREDENTIAL REQUEST
Our scheme is credential-based as the one pro-
posed in [9]. A credential serves the same pur-
pose as a ticket. At the beginning of each month,
customers need to request a certain amount of
credentials from the control center for power
usage plan submission in the whole month. Cus-
tomers are authenticated using their real identi-
ties in this module. Each customer (with the help
of his/her smart meter) sends credential signing
requests to the control center. Each credential is
of the format <CID, DOI>. CID is a unique cre-
dential identity for each credential; DOI indicates
the date that the credential is issued. By present-
ing a credential, a customer can request V points
of additional power supply (the concept of points
is explained in the next subsection).
In our scheme, all credentials are generated
by customers. To make a credential anonymous,
a customer first blinds it using a blinding factor
(i.e., mixes it with some random components so
that one cannot recognize its original content
based on the blind version) and sends it to the
Customers do not
want to reveal their
private information
to the power 
operator. Besides,
the communication
channels from the
smart meters to the
control center and
from the substations
to the control center
could be the public
Internet and is
always considered
unsafe.
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control center. The control center signs the cre-
dential using its private key and sends it back to
the customer. The customer performs some
computation to remove the blinding factor in
order to obtain control center’s signature on the
real credential. Interested readers may refer to
any cryptographic textbook about the actual
mathematical operation involved. To prevent a
customer from generating an invalid credential
(e.g., CID being used before or DOI being out-
dated), a customer has to generate n times more
credentials using different CIDs and blinding
factors, where n is predetermined by the control
center. For each n credentials, the control center
randomly challenges the customer to open (n –
1) of them and verify the details in them. If the
information in all the opened credentials is valid,
the control center signs the remaining one using
its private key. Otherwise, the control center
signs nothing and returns an error message to
the customer. The control center computes and
records the number of credentials Ntotal it has
signed for that customer. Recall that the control
center’s public key is assumed to be known by
everyone, while its private key is only known to
itself. Thus, its signature can be verified by
everyone, but can only be generated by it. Also
note that although all credentials are known by
the customers during generation, it will not
cause any security problem because a credential
is valid only if it contains the control center’s sig-
nature. 
To ease readers’ understanding, we summa-
rize the flow of this module in Fig. 2. 
POWER USAGE PLAN SUBMISSION
This module can be executed at different time
periods, say one day or one week ahead of actu-
al power usage. Note that to preserve customers’
privacy, this module is run anonymously and cus-
tomers do not have to authenticate themselves.
As such, the control center cannot tell who the
sender of a certain power usage plan is.
To submit a power usage plan, after commu-
nicating with appliances in the house, the smart
meter of a customer first summarizes and con-
structs a power usage scheduling table like the
one shown in Table 1. 
The smart meter then downloads the up-to-
date charging profile from the control center.
This charging profile indicates different charging
ratios among different hours. For example, a
power operator may charge a customer twice as
much if he/she requests additional power during
peak hours, as mentioned earlier. As a result, a
customer may need to issue twice the number of
credentials (i.e., twice the number of points) to
request the same amount of additional power
units during peak hours as during non-peak
hours.
After that, the smart meter attaches enough
credentials. Let us consider the example in Table
1. Assume that the power operator charges cus-
tomers twice as much during the peak hours
from 19:01 to 07:00 the next day. That is, a cus-
tomer will be charged 1 point for each power
unit from 07:01 to 19:00, while he/she will be
charged 2 points for each power unit the rest of
the time. Also, we assume that by presenting a
credential, a customer can request for 20 points
of additional power. Then based on the above
example, the customer has to present 100/20 +
120/20 + 160/20 × 2 = 27 credentials.
Next the smart meter encrypts the power
usage scheduling table as well as the credentials
symmetrically using a randomly generated ses-
sion key and encrypts that session key asymmet-
rically using the control center’s public key. The
whole encrypted block is then transmitted to the
control center.
Upon receiving the message, the control cen-
ter obtains the session key using its private key
and obtains the power usage scheduling table as
well as the credentials using the decrypted ses-
sion key. It then validates each credential by
checking against its own signature and ensuring
DOI is not outdated. If all validations are suc-
cessful, the control center schedules the genera-
tors and the power level in different districts at
appropriate times. Also, it records the credential
identities CIDs into its local database so that the
same set of credential identities cannot be
reused. The control center then schedules appro-
priate control decisions to adjust the amount of
power generated.
To ease readers’ understanding, we summa-
rize the flow of this module in Fig. 3. 
RECONCILIATION
At the end of each billing period, reconciliation
will be carried out. Note that similar to the reg-
istration module, this module is not anonymous.
Customers need to be authenticated using their
Figure 2. Summary of credential request module.
Blinded credentials
Smart meter
1) Generates n times more
credentials than necessary
2) Blinds each credential using
a randomly generated blinding
factor
Control center
3) For each n credentials,
challenges the customer to
open (n-1) of them and
verify the information (e.g.
identity used before?)
4) If all of them are valid,
signs the remaining credential
5) Records number of
credentials signed
6) Remove blinding factors
from the signatures to obtain
the real credentials
Challenge to open
(n-1)/n of them
Opened credentials
Signed credentials
(1/n of the initial
credentials)
Table 1. Sample power usage scheduling table.
Time Additional power unitsrequired
07:01–08:00 100
08:01–09:00 120
19:01–23:00 160
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real identities in this phase. During this phase,
the smart meter of a customer sends all the cre-
dentials that have not been used to the control
center. The control center then checks the cre-
dentials as usual, counts the total number of
unused credentials Nunused, and computes the
total number of used credential Nusedas Ntotal –
Nunused. As such, the customer needs to pay for
the (Ntotal – Nunused) points of additional power
requested.
To check against whether a customer request-
ed roughly the same amount of power as he/she
used, the power operator may use a traditional
kWh meter to collect the monthly power con-
sumption, and the system will compare the con-
sumption with the points computed above to see
whether they are comparable. If there is a big
difference between them, an extra charge can be
added to the monthly bill of the customer. How-
ever, one point to note is that since the power
operator imposes different charging profiles dur-
ing peak hours and during non-peak hours, kWh
meters have to be adjusted accordingly so that
they can put a heavier weight to the electricity
used during peak hours (e.g., the recording plate
rotates at a higher speed).
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON
PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we first evaluate our scheme
according to the security requirements listed ear-
lier (we skip the formal security proof here due
to space limitations). Next, we discuss some per-
formance issues such as signature generation
time and the impact of V (the number of points
represented by each credential).
As mentioned earlier, we target designing a
system to resolve four security problems: mes-
sage authentication, identity privacy preserva-
tion, request message confidentiality, and
traceability. Let us consider them one by one.
Message authentication: At the registration
phase, a customer needs to authenticate him/her-
self using the private key signature before
requesting any signing of credentials. So when
the customer presents the signed credentials
during the power requesting phase, he also
proves him/herself authenticated.
Identity privacy preservation: Customers only
reveal their identities in registration and recon-
ciliation modules. In the power usage plan sub-
mission module, when the customer presents the
credentials, the control center cannot relate
them with the customer. Due to the properties
of the blind signature, the credential identity is
only known by the owner. The credentials do not
reveal the identity of the customers either.
Request message confidentiality: Before
sending out the power usage plan, the smart
meter first encrypts the power usage scheduling
table as well as the credentials symmetrically
using a randomly generated session key and
encrypts that session key asymmetrically using
the control center’s public key. Thus, no one
except the control center can decrypt the mes-
sage. Confidentiality of the power usage plan is
thus preserved.
Traceability: In registration and reconcilia-
tion modules, a customer needs to present
his/her identity (i.e., not anonymous) to the con-
trol center. The total amount of points used by
each customer over a certain period of time (say
a month) can be known by the control center.
The customer can then be properly charged at
the end of the charging period.
Regarding the signature generation time,
according to [9], signing 10,000 credentials using
a consumer PC with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU,
T5870 @ 2.00 GHz and with 1024 bits (2048
bits) RSA needs only about 1 min (10 min).
Also, this process can be done in a batch mode
during non-peak hours. Therefore, it should not
cause a burden to the control center.
Now let us investigate the impact of V (the
number of points each credential represents) to
our scheme. Assume that at a certain power
usage plan submission process, a customer has to
submit a total of P points. Without loss of gener-
ality, assume that each credential represents V
points. The number of credentials the customer
has to submit is ⎡P/V⎤. Obviously this leads to
some waste to both the customer and the power
operator and this waste is bounded by V points.
For example, if P = 93 and V = 20, the waste
becomes 7 points. In fact, this waste is related to
some unnecessary additional power request. To
the customer, he/she needs to pay the necessary
charge for it. To the power operator, it needs to
generate excess electricity. Nevertheless, one
may notice that if V is close to the basic unit of
P (e.g., V = 1 if P takes an integer value), this
waste can be minimized. However, it should also
be noted that the smaller the value of V, the
more credentials a customer has to present in
the power usage plan submission module. This
in turn leads to higher communication overhead
and higher credential generation overhead at the
control center. Therefore, developers should
take into consideration this trade-off when
adopting our scheme in their system.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we briefly introduce what a smart
grid is. We then introduce a power request
paradigm in which a customer is allowed to sub-
mit a power usage plan in advance and highlight-
ed the importance of smart grid security. Next
we propose a secure and privacy-preserving
power request scheme based on the techniques
of anonymous credential and blind signature.
Credentials are generated by the customer but
Figure 3. Summary of a power usage plan submission module.
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control center’s public key
Control center
6) Decrypts using private key
to obtain session key
7) Decrypts using session key
to obtain power usage
scheduling table and
credentials
8) Validates each credential
9) Schedules generators and
power levels in different
districts at appropriate times
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are blindly signed by the control center. Our
scheme fulfills two seemingly contradictory secu-
rity requirements:
• All customers’ privacy including their elec-
tricity usage pattern is preserved from any-
one including the control center.
• All customers’ power requests are properly
authenticated.
The customers can even be charged based on
the amount of electricity requested on top of dif-
ferent charging profiles across peak and non-
peak hours. We remark that this may not be the
best solution to the problem. We aim to intro-
duce these security problems to readers and
stimulate the interest of the community to inves-
tigate these problems further. 
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